FBI 正約談多家美國(guó)大學(xué)，希望他們能協(xié)助 FBI 監(jiān)視來自中國(guó)的留學(xué)生和學(xué)者。
對(duì)此，8月30日和9月3日，哥倫比亞大學(xué)校長(zhǎng)伯靈格(Lee Bollinger)在《華盛頓郵報(bào)》與哥倫比亞大學(xué)官方網(wǎng)站上兩次發(fā)表公開信，對(duì)FBI說“不”。
布林格對(duì)FBI的所為更顯深惡痛絕，認(rèn)為此等行為非?；闹?，并借此將此事公開于國(guó)際大眾，尤其強(qiáng)調(diào)所謂 “中國(guó)學(xué)生間諜” 論點(diǎn)可笑荒唐：
“一個(gè)人外國(guó)人，飛了大半個(gè)地球來美國(guó)，就是為了‘潛伏’到我們的大學(xué)里，了解我們最新的學(xué)術(shù)發(fā)現(xiàn)。而這個(gè)人大可坐在自己舒適的辦公室內(nèi)，把關(guān)鍵字輸入進(jìn)搜索引擎就能夠閱讀學(xué)術(shù)期刊?；蛘咄瑯拥剡@個(gè)人也可訪問美國(guó)專利及商標(biāo)局的網(wǎng)站，那兒有最新發(fā)明專利的詳細(xì)介紹?！?/p>
以下是公開信全文：
聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局(FBI)加強(qiáng)了對(duì)包括我校在內(nèi)的大學(xué)校園研究工作的審查。
為了阻止知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)非法轉(zhuǎn)移給外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，執(zhí)法和行政機(jī)構(gòu)正在鼓勵(lì)美國(guó)學(xué)者和管理人員制定更嚴(yán)格的渠道，以監(jiān)控外國(guó)出生的學(xué)生和訪問學(xué)者——尤其是華裔學(xué)生和學(xué)者。
隨著學(xué)生們重返校園，這種監(jiān)控正在將經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治方面的擔(dān)憂與美國(guó)憲法《第一修正案》所倡導(dǎo)的自由置于沖突之中。
誠(chéng)然，政府資助的諸如網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全和生物恐怖主義等國(guó)家安全領(lǐng)域的學(xué)術(shù)研究是有理由敏感的。同樣，與美國(guó)公司合作進(jìn)行的學(xué)術(shù)研究——這是大多數(shù)非法技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓的主要目標(biāo)——其商業(yè)創(chuàng)新成果確實(shí)需要保護(hù)。
大學(xué)有義務(wù)遵守現(xiàn)有的安全規(guī)定，以合理的方式實(shí)行安全措施，并在懷疑存在明顯的間諜行為時(shí)，與執(zhí)法部門和企業(yè)研究伙伴充分配合。在某種程度上，我們?cè)谶@些方面都有不足之處——過去的確存在學(xué)者與外國(guó)政府分享敏感知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的個(gè)案——我們可以而且必須做得更好。
然而，只有一小部分在校園里進(jìn)行的研究是“秘密”的。事實(shí)恰恰相反。學(xué)術(shù)研究的目的是分享——發(fā)表到公共領(lǐng)域，以推動(dòng)人類進(jìn)步。突破性的醫(yī)學(xué)發(fā)現(xiàn)、農(nóng)業(yè)創(chuàng)新(使全球數(shù)十億人免于饑餓)、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、人工智能，所有這些都是來自大學(xué)的公開研究成果。
因此，外國(guó)人不需要飛越大半個(gè)地球去“滲透”我們偉大的大學(xué)了和了解我們的最新見解和發(fā)現(xiàn)：他們大可坐在海外的舒適辦公室或宿舍，只需要在搜索引擎里輸入關(guān)鍵字，就可以閱讀同行評(píng)議的學(xué)術(shù)期刊?；蛘撸瑯拥?，他們也可以訪問美國(guó)專利商標(biāo)局的網(wǎng)站，網(wǎng)站上的專利保護(hù)申請(qǐng)書就提供了所有最新發(fā)明的詳細(xì)描述。
因此，作為一個(gè)花了50年時(shí)間倡導(dǎo)言論和集會(huì)自由的人，當(dāng)?shù)弥覀兇髮W(xué)的教職工，或許還有學(xué)生，竟然被要求去監(jiān)控外國(guó)學(xué)生和同事的行為時(shí)，我感到極度憂慮。這與我們的原則是對(duì)立的。
大學(xué)的使命是培養(yǎng)一種有利于思考、實(shí)驗(yàn)和創(chuàng)造的開放的氛圍。美國(guó)的高等教育令全世界羨慕，恰恰是因?yàn)樗鼰o與倫比的開放和多樣性。吸引——并歡迎——世界上最聰明的人，無論其國(guó)籍或出生國(guó)是什么，這就是我們所關(guān)心的。
換句話說，美國(guó)的大學(xué)模式是一種戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢(shì)，而不是對(duì)美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的阻礙。我們的行政人員、教授和研究學(xué)者不是、也不應(yīng)該成為美國(guó)執(zhí)法部門的一員。具有諷刺意味的是，在我看來，F(xiàn)BI顯然認(rèn)為我們最大的弱點(diǎn)是我們最大的優(yōu)勢(shì)。
在我擔(dān)任校長(zhǎng)的哥倫比亞大學(xué)，數(shù)千名的學(xué)生和教師代表著150多個(gè)國(guó)家。我們這些主要研究型大學(xué)的管理者，即使我們想要，也不能限制知識(shí)自由。大學(xué)文化與系統(tǒng)審查的不相容性或許可以解釋，為什么即使是訪問過我們校園的執(zhí)法官員也只是提出我們應(yīng)該保持警惕，而很少提供規(guī)范性指導(dǎo)。
海外競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手未經(jīng)授權(quán)使用知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的問題。但對(duì)外國(guó)出生的學(xué)者進(jìn)行監(jiān)視是錯(cuò)誤的解決方案。如果執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)有合理的擔(dān)憂，我認(rèn)為他們應(yīng)該根據(jù)真正的威脅去識(shí)別和監(jiān)控那些他們指定為“可疑人士”的人，而不是對(duì)整個(gè)國(guó)籍提出擔(dān)憂。
我在高等教育界的許多同事，以及兩黨聯(lián)合成立的反知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)竊取委員會(huì)，都提倡一種更為有效的做法，就是增加向外國(guó)出生的大學(xué)畢業(yè)生發(fā)放綠卡的數(shù)量。如果允許的話，這些國(guó)際學(xué)者中的許多人，特別是在科學(xué)、技術(shù)、工程和數(shù)學(xué)領(lǐng)域的學(xué)者，會(huì)更愿意留在美國(guó)為美國(guó)政府工作，他們也可以為美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和繁榮做出貢獻(xiàn)。但根據(jù)目前的規(guī)定，當(dāng)他們完成學(xué)業(yè)后，我們很難讓他們留下來。他們帶著在這里學(xué)到的非凡知識(shí)回到自己的國(guó)家，這些知識(shí)可以為未來針對(duì)美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的商業(yè)策略提供參考。
我們學(xué)院和大學(xué)的使命是，在廣泛的議題上進(jìn)行公開、有力的調(diào)查。我們的高等教育機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該為使美國(guó)成為這個(gè)世界上有史以來最具創(chuàng)新精神的國(guó)家做出更多努力，而不是相反。
以下是英文原文：
The FBI has stepped up its scrutiny of research practices at college and university campuses — including mine.
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies determined to thwart the illegal transfer of intellectual property to foreign rivals are encouraging U.S. academics and administrators to develop more robust protocols for monitoring foreign-born students and visiting scholars — particularly if they are ethnically Chinese.
With students returning to campus, these policing attempts thrust economic and political concerns into fierce conflict with First Amendment freedoms.
To be sure, government-funded academic research in such national security realms as cybersecurity and bioterrorism is justifiably sensitive. Likewise, academic research conducted in collaboration with U.S. companies — a principal target of most unlawful technology transfers — leads to commercial innovations that warrant protections. Universities have an obligation to comply with existing security protocols, identify sensible ways to bolster them, and cooperate fully with law enforcement authorities and corporate research partners if clear acts of espionage are suspected. To the extent we are falling short in any of these areas — and yes, there have been isolated incidents of academics sharing sensitive intellectual property with foreign governments — we can and must do better.
At the same time, however, only a fraction of the research conducted on campus is “secret.” Indeed, the reality is just the opposite. Academic research is intended to be shared — released into the public domain to advance human progress. Groundbreaking medical discoveries, agricultural innovations credited with saving billions of people worldwide from starvation, the Internet, artificial intelligence: All are the result of publicly available, university-based research.
With students returning to campus, these policing attempts thrust economic and political concerns into fierce conflict with First Amendment freedoms.
Consequently, a foreign national need not fly halfway around the world to “infiltrate” our great universities and learn about our latest insights and findings: With some notable exceptions, she can type words into a search engine and peruse peer-reviewed academic journals from the comfort of an office or dorm room overseas. Or, similarly, she can visit the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s website, where applications for patent protection provide detailed descriptions of recent innovations.
And so, most worrisome to me, as someone who has spent five decades advocating freedom of expression and assembly, is the notion that university personnel — and perhaps students themselves — should be asked to monitor the movements of foreign-born students and colleagues. This is antithetical to who we are.
The mission of a university is to foster an open atmosphere conducive to speculation, experimentation and creation. American higher education is the envy of the world not in spite of, but because of, its unrivaled commitment to openness and diversity. Attracting — and welcoming — the brightest minds in the world, regardless of nationality or country of origin, is what we’re all about.
To put it another way, the U.S. university model is a strategic advantage, not a hindrance to American competitiveness. Our administrators, professors and research scholars are not, and should not become, an arm of U.S. law enforcement. Ironically, what the FBI apparently considers our great vulnerability is, in my view, our greatest strength.
At Columbia University, where I am president, thousands of students and faculty represent more than 150 countries. We stewards of major research universities couldn’t contain intellectual freedom even if we wanted to. The incompatibility of university culture with systematic scrutiny may explain why even law enforcement officials who have visited our campus have offered little prescriptive guidance, instead offering that we should be vigilant.
The unauthorized use of intellectual property by overseas competitors is a serious problem. But the surveillance of foreign-born scholars in this country is the wrong solution. If law enforcement agencies have legitimate concerns, it seems to me that they should identify and monitor those they designate as “suspicious people” based on real threats, not broad worries about entire nationalities.
A more effective approach — advocated by many of my colleagues in higher education as well as the bipartisan Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property — is to expand the number of green cards awarded to foreign-born graduates of our great colleges and universities. Many of these international scholars, especially in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics, would, if permitted, prefer to remain in the United States and work for U.S.-based companies after graduation, where they could also contribute to the United States’ economic growth and prosperity. But under the present rules, when their academic studies are completed, we make it difficult for them to stay. They return to their countries with the extraordinary knowledge they acquired here, which can inform future commercial strategies deployed against U.S. competitors.
The mandate of our colleges and universities is to pursue open, robust inquiry across a wide range of topics. Our institutions of higher learning should do more — not less — of what made the United States the most innovative nation in the history of the world.
發(fā)完這份公開信后，布林格還于9月3日發(fā)送內(nèi)部電子郵件，向哥倫比亞全體師生重申自己的立場(chǎng)。
“我一般不會(huì)在學(xué)校內(nèi)轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)自己寫的東西，但鑒于大家對(duì)近期發(fā)生事情很關(guān)心，我會(huì)這么做(轉(zhuǎn)發(fā))?！编]件呼應(yīng)布林格《華盛頓郵報(bào)》署名文章，指出FBI正在“鼓勵(lì)”大學(xué)設(shè)立機(jī)制，監(jiān)視外籍學(xué)生學(xué)者，尤其是針對(duì)中國(guó)籍人士?！暗髮W(xué)不能監(jiān)視自己的人，這不是我們?！?/p>
以上講的就是哥大校長(zhǎng)刊文硬剛FBI：我不會(huì)監(jiān)視我的外國(guó)學(xué)生介紹，希望能給各位赴美留學(xué)的學(xué)子們指點(diǎn)迷津。托普仕留學(xué)可以為你排憂解難，同時(shí)，更多關(guān)于赴美留學(xué)的相關(guān)資訊在等著你，絕對(duì)讓你“瀏覽”忘返。在此，衷心祝愿各位學(xué)子們能夠順利奔赴自己心目中理想的學(xué)校并且學(xué)業(yè)有成!
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